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SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:   
A FRONTIER OF NEW LEGAL ISSUES 
 
By Justin P. Murphy and Adrian Fontecilla* 
 
Cite as: Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in 
Government Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New 
Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH 11 (2013), available at 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i3/article11.pdf. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] As the newest pillar of communication in today’s society, social 
media is revolutionizing how the world does business, discovers and 
shares news, and instantly engages with friends and family.  Not 
surprisingly, because social media factors into the majority of cases in 
some respect, this exploding medium significantly affects government 
investigations and criminal litigation.  Social media evidence includes, 
among other things, photographs, status updates, a person’s location at a 
certain time, and direct communications to or from a defendant’s social 
media account.  This Article will examine the importance of social media 
in government investigations and criminal litigation, including access to 
and use of social media evidence, constitutional issues that social media 
evidence raises, the authentication and admissibility of such evidence, in 
addition to the impact of social media on jurors.  
 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
[2] Social media use is widespread.  Ninety-one percent of today’s 
online adults use social media regularly, which has become the number 
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one activity on the web.1  “People continue to spend more time on social 
networks than any other category of [web]sites,” accounting for “20% of 
their time spent on PCs and 30% of their mobile [use] time.”2  Social 
media use in the United States alone has increased by 356% since 2006.3  
52% of Americans now have at least one social media profile,4 more than 
one billion people use Facebook actively each month,5 and 32% of all 
Internet users are now using Twitter.6  Notably, some of the largest growth 
in the last year has been among forty-five to fifty-four year old Americans, 
                                                
* Justin P. Murphy is a counsel in Crowell & Moring’s Washington, D.C. office where he 
practices in the firm’s White Collar & Regulatory Enforcement Group and E-Discovery 
and Information Management Group.  Adrian Fontecilla is an associate in Crowell & 
Moring’s Washington, D.C. office where he practices in the firm’s Antitrust Group.  Both 
are contributors to Crowell & Moring’s E-Discovery Law Insights blog - 
http://www.ediscoverylawinsights.com/. 
  
1 EXPERIAN MARKETING SERVICES, THE 2012 DIGITAL MARKETER: BENCHMARK AND 
TREND REPORT 79 (2012), available at http://www.experian.com/simmons-
research/register-2012-digital-marketer.html. 
 
2 NIELSEN, STATE OF THE MEDIA: SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT 2012, at 4 (2012), available at 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/social/2012/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2012). 
 
3 Connect: Social Media Madness U.S. 2012, NETPOP RESEARCH (April 2012), available 
at http://netpopresearch.com/social-media-madness. 
 
4 Tom Webster, The Social Habit 2011, EDISON RESEARCH (May 29, 2011), 
http://www.edisonresearch.com/home/archives/2011/05/the_social_habit_2011.php. 
 
5 Aaron Smith, Laurie Segall & Stacy Cowley, Facebook Reaches One Billion Users, 
CNN MONEY (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:50 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology/facebook-billion-users/index.html. 
 
6 Brian Honigman, 100 Fascinating Social Media Statistics and Figures From 2012, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2012, 7:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-
honigman/100-fascinating-social-me_b_2185281.html. 
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55% of whom now have a profile on a social networking site.7 
 
[3] There are hundreds of social networking websites with each 
catering to a different demographic and providing a different type of 
content.8  Moreover, their users are constantly creating massive amounts 
of data.  “Twitter users send [one] billion tweets every two and a half 
days,” 9  Instagram users upload forty million images every day, 10 
Facebook users share 684,478 pieces of content every minute, and 
YouTube users upload forty-eight hours of new video every minute.11  
Social media users create more than just photos, videos, and tweets.  They 
share other information, such as their location as well.  “As of 2012, 
[seventeen] billion location-tagged posts and check-ins were logged.”12  
The myriad and continually changing ways to share information via social 
media has resulted in a digital goldmine of potential evidence, such as 
profiles, lists of friends, group memberships, messages, chat logs, tweets, 
photos, videos, tags, GPS locations, likes, check-ins, and login 
                                                
7 Erik Qualman, 10 New 2012 Social Media Stats = WOW!, SOCIALNOMICS, 
http://www.socialnomics.net/2012/06/06/10-new-2012-social-media-stats-wow/ (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2012). 
 
8 See PINGDOM, SOCIAL NETWORK DEMOGRAPHICS IN 2012 (2012), available at 
http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/08/21/report-social-network-demographics-in-2012/. 
 
9 Nielsen and Twitter Establish Social TV Rating, NIELSEN (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/press-room/2012/nielsen-and-twitter-establish-
social-tv-rating.html.  
 
10 Instagram Press Center, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/press/ (last visited Feb. 1, 
2013). 
 
11 Josh James, How Much Data Is Created Every Minute?, DOMO (June 8, 2012), 
http://www.domo.com/blog/2012/06/how-much-data-is-created-every-minute/. 
 
12 Honigman, supra note 6. 
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timetables.13 
 
[4] The information that social media providers make available is 
staggering.  When a phone company responds to a government subpoena 
or search warrant, it may provide call or message logs.  In contrast, when a 
social media company like Facebook responds to a government subpoena, 
it could provide the user’s profile, wall posts, photos that the user 
uploaded, photos in which the user was tagged, a comprehensive list of the 
user’s friends with their Facebook IDs, and a long table of login and IP 
data.14  In addition, with the advent of location-based services that social 
media companies like Facebook, Twitter, and FourSquare offer, precise 
location information will be increasingly maintained in the ordinary 
course of business and subject to the same subpoenas and search 
warrants. 15   One newsworthy example demonstrating the amount of 
information available to law enforcement from a simple photograph is that 
of John McAfee, the antivirus company founder who was recently on the 
run from law enforcement authorities investigating the murder of his 
neighbor.  McAfee was forced out of hiding when it was found that a 
                                                
13 See Quagliarello v. Dewees, No. 09-4870, 2011 WL 3438090, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 
2011) (“As the use of social media such as Myspace and Facebook has proliferated, so 
too has the value of these websites as a source of evidence for litigants.”). 
 
14 See, e.g., Carly Carioli, When the Cops Subpoena Your Facebook Information, Here’s 
What Facebook Sends the Cops, THE PHOENIX (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:30 AM), 
http://blog.thephoenix.com/blogs/phlog/archive/2012/04/06/when-police-subpoena-your-
facebook-information-heres-what-facebook-sends-cops.aspx (noting the breadth of 
information Facebook provided in response to a subpoena from the Boston Police 
Department).   
 
15 Cf. MARCIA HOFMANN ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 2012: WHEN THE 
GOVERNMENT COMES KNOCKING, WHO HAS YOUR BACK? 7 (2012), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/who-has-your-back-2012_0_0.pdf (discussing 
issues arising from government access to location data and the companies that collect 
data). 
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photo of him published on a blog was embedded with GPS metadata 
pinpointing his exact location in Guatemala.16  Not surprisingly, each 
social media request can yield admissions or incriminating photos in 
addition to other evidence.17 
 
III.  ACCESSING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
 
[5] It is no secret that government agencies mine social networking 
websites for evidence.  Even without having to seek a warrant from the 
court or issue a subpoena, there are troves of social media evidence 
publicly available.18  For example, the New York Police Department has a 
social media unit that mines Facebook, Twitter, and other social media 
sites for evidence of crimes and potential criminal activity.19  Moreover, a 
                                                
16 Eyder Peralta, Betrayed By Metadata: John McAfee Admits He’s Really in Guatemala, 
NPR (Dec. 4, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2012/12/04/166487197/betrayed-by-metadata-john-mcafee-admits-hes-really-in-
guatemala. 
 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 664 F.3d 758, 761-62 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming 
the conviction of a defendant sentenced to 12 years in prison based in part on over 800 
private chats with adolescent girls and inappropriate pictures that were obtained through a 
search warrant for defendant’s Facebook account). 
 
18 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION AND PLANNING: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL 
MEDIA MONITORING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS INITIATIVE 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_publiclyavailablesocialmedi
a.pdf (noting that the National Operations Center will use publicly available search 
engines and content aggregators to monitor activities on social media sites); see also Role 
of Social Media in Law Enforcement Significant and Growing, LEXISNEXIS (July 18, 
2012), http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/press-release.aspx?id=1342623085481181 
(stating that, according to the results of a comprehensive survey, over eighty percent of 
local and federal agencies use social media during investigations). 
 
19 Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Forms New Social Media Unit to Mine Facebook and 
Twitter for Mayhem, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
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majority of government agencies are active participants who contribute 
content and solicit information through social media.20  Given the amount 
of information publicly available and the avenues that the government has 
to seek out such information, usually the government does not need a 
search warrant, subpoena, or court order to obtain social media evidence.   
 
[6] There are countless cases involving defendants who are arrested 
because of information, photos, or admissions posted to social media sites.  
For example, a defendant in Kentucky was jailed after he posted a photo 
of himself siphoning gas from a police car onto Facebook.21  Another 
defendant broke into a Washington, D.C. home to steal a coat, a laptop, 
and cash, subsequently using the victim’s laptop to post a picture of 
himself wearing the stolen coat and holding up the stolen cash to the 
victim’s Facebook page.22  The photo was used later to secure a guilty plea 
from the defendant.23  While some sites allow users to control what 
content the public can access, many users do not make use of such tools.  
In fact, twenty five percent of Facebook users do not use any type of 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-forms-new-social-media-unit-facebook-
twitter-mayhem-article-1.945242. 
 
20 New Study Shows 66% of Government Organizations Have Adopted Social 
Networking, Collaboration Tools, SABA (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://www.saba.com/company/press-releases/2010/saba-and-hci-publish-study-of-social-
networking-in-government/. 
 
21 See generally Eric Larson, 8 Dumb Criminals Caught Through Facebook, MASHABLE 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/12/12/crime-social-media/. 
 
22 Id. 
 
23 Id. 
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privacy controls.24 
 
[7] In addition to searching for publicly available evidence, 
government agents are allowed to go further than defense counsel in 
pursuing social media evidence for a criminal proceeding.  To bypass the 
need for a search warrant, government agents may pierce the privacy 
settings of a person’s social media account by creating fake online 
identities or by securing cooperating witnesses to grant them access to 
information.25  For example, in United States v. Meregildo, the defendant 
adjusted the privacy settings on his Facebook account so that only his 
Facebook “friends” could view his postings.26  The government obtained 
the incriminating evidence against the defendant through a cooperating 
witness who happened to be Facebook “friends” with the defendant.27  The 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his Facebook 
account, arguing that the government had violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.28  The court found:   
 
                                                
24 See Shea Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Instagram – Social Media Statistics 
and Facts 2012, ALL TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-stats-2012_b30651. 
 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Robison, No. 11CR380 DWF/TNL, 2012 WL 1110086, at 
*1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2012) (noting that law enforcement created fake online identity 
and became Facebook friends with defendant, “which permitted [the government] to view 
[the defendant’s] name and photo on his Facebook account”); United States v. Phillips, 
Criminal No. 3:06–CR–47, 2009 WL 1918931, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. July 1, 2009) (noting 
that the government “created an undercover user profile on www.myspace.com”). 
 
26 United States v. Meregildo, No. 11 Cr. 576(WHP), 2012 WL 3264501, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2012). 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 Id. at *1. 
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Where Facebook privacy settings allow viewership of 
postings by “friends,” the Government may access them 
through a cooperating witness who is a “friend” without 
violating the Fourth Amendment. . . . While [the defendant] 
undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile would not 
be shared with law enforcement, he had no justifiable 
expectation that his “friends” would keep his profile 
private.  And the wider his circle of “friends,” the more 
likely [the defendant’s] posts would be viewed by someone 
he never expected to see them.  [The Defendant’s] 
legitimate expectation of privacy ended when he 
disseminated posts to his “friends” because those “friends” 
were free to use the information however they wanted—
including sharing it with the Government.29 
 
[8] Recently, federal authorities relied heavily on social media to build 
their case against four defendants who were allegedly involved in an Al 
Qaeda inspired terrorist cell based in California. 30   The criminal 
complaint, which included a section titled “Defendants’ Social Media,” 
provides a glimpse into the various ways that law enforcement uses social 
media in its investigations.31  The investigators used an “online covert 
employee” who posed as a terrorism sympathizer to elicit damaging 
statements from the defendants, recorded Skype conversations between a 
confidential informant and the defendants, and relied on the social media 
                                                
29 Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
 
30 Ryan Gallagher, Feds Monitor Facebook “Likes,” Infiltrate Skype Chats To Build 
Terrorism Case, SLATE (Nov. 29, 2012, 4:33 PM), 
http://mobile.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/11/29/facebook_likes_skype_used_to_bu
ild_fbi_case_against_california_terrorism.html. 
 
31 Complaint at ¶¶ 26-28, United States v. Kabir, No. ED12-0431M (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 
2012), 2012 WL 6576560. 
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content that each defendant “liked,” “shared,” or on which the defendant 
commented.32   
 
[9] The Securities and Exchange Commission also recently issued a 
Wells Notice for the first time based on a social media communication.33  
On December 5, 2012, Netflix disclosed that it had received a Wells 
Notice from the SEC Enforcement Staff for allegedly violating public 
disclosure rules when its CEO, Reed Hastings, posted onto his Facebook 
with more than 200,000 followers that, “Netflix monthly viewing 
exceeded one billion hours for the first time ever in June [2012].”34  After 
receiving the notice, Hastings noted in a letter to shareholders that, “[W]e 
think posting to over 200,000 people is very public, especially because 
many of my subscribers are reporters and bloggers;” nevertheless, the SEC 
has provided no formal guidance concerning the use of social media, 
Regulation FD, and communications with the investing public. 35 
 
IV.  SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES, SUBPOENAS, AND WARRANTS 
 
[10] Given the digital goldmine of potential evidence available from 
social media companies, it is not surprising that they are increasingly 
targeted in search warrants and government subpoenas in criminal matters.  
                                                
32 Gallagher, supra note 30. 
 
33 See Netflix Form 8-K filed Dec. 5, 2012; CHRISTOPHER GARCIA & MELANIE CONROY, 
REG FD ALERT: APPLYING SECURITIES LAWS TO SOCIAL MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 1 
(2012), available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil_Alert_Sec_Lit_Enforcement_Dec_21_2012.pdf. 
 
34 Id. at 2.   
 
35 See Netflix CEO’s Facebook Post Triggered SEC Wells Notice, CNBC (Dec. 7, 2012, 
7:10 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100289227/Netflix_CEO039s_Facebook_Post_Triggered_SEC_
Wells_Notice; GARCIA & CONROY, supra note 33, at 1. 
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For example, Twitter “received more government requests” for user 
information in the “first half of 2012 . . . than in the entirety of 2011.”36  In 
addition, approximately 80% of those requests were from authorities in the 
United States.37  Google, which operates social networking sites including 
YouTube and Google+, continues to receive subpoenas and search 
warrants in criminal matters at a rapidly accelerating pace.  Statistics 
published by Google, which “primarily cover requests in criminal 
matters,”38 show that the number of Google user data requests received 
from government authorities in the United States more than doubled from 
2009 to 2012 and that the United States accounts for over 39% of user data 
requests received from government authorities around the world.39   
 
[11] Moreover, the prevalence of social media evidence in criminal 
proceedings will continue to proliferate as government agencies continue 
to formally train their personnel to search for and collect social media 
evidence.  A recent survey of over 1,200 federal, state, and local law 
enforcement professionals reveals that social media is widely used to 
                                                
36 Twitter Transparency Report, TWITTER BLOG (July 2, 2012), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2012/07/twitter-transparency-report.html. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Transparency Report—FAQ, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/faq/ (last visited Jan.15, 
2013). 
 
39 Transparency Report—User Data Requests, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/US/ (last visited Jan. 16, 
2013) (demonstrating that requests increased from 3,580 in a period between July to 
December 2009 to 8,438 in a period from July to December 2012); Transparency 
Report—User Data Requests, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?t=table (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2013) (demonstrating that the United States accounts for 8,438 of the 21, 
389 user data requests Google received from July to December 2012). 
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assist in investigations, few learned how to use social media for 
investigations through formal training, and “74% of those not currently 
using it . . . intend to start using it.”40  Moreover, the case law is already 
replete with instances in which the government obtained social media 
evidence through a warrant or subpoena directed at a social media 
company. 41   Social media evidence is the new frontier of criminal 
proceedings and it raises unique legal challenges, including issues of 
admissibility and a defendant’s constitutional rights in material that social 
media companies maintain.   
 
V.  ACCOUNTING FOR THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
[12] Federal law provides that in some circumstances, the government 
may compel social media companies to produce social media evidence 
without a warrant.  The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) governs the 
ability of governmental entities to compel service providers, such as 
Twitter and Facebook, to produce content (e.g., posts and tweets) and non-
content customer records (e.g., name and address) in certain 
                                                
40 Role of Social Media in Law Enforcement Significant and Growing, supra note 18. 
 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 664 F.3d 758, 762 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting 
hundreds of Facebook private chats obtained through a search warrant); United States v. 
Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that law enforcement used account and 
IP address information obtained from MySpace via an administrative subpoena to 
subpoena defendant’s Internet provider for his name and address); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying anonymous 
intervenor’s motion to quash a subpoena issued to Twitter by a federal grand jury for 
records pertaining to the intervenor’s identity); United States v. Sayer, Criminal No. 2:11 
cr 113 DBH, 2012 WL 2180577, at *3 (D. Me. June 13, 2012) (using subpoenas to obtain 
evidence from Facebook and MySpace); United States v. Meregildo, No. 11 Cr. 
576(WHP), 2012 WL 3264501, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (obtaining evidence 
through warrant issued to Facebook); People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 597 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 2012) (observing that state sent Twitter a subpoena seeking to obtain 
defendant’s user information and Tweets). 
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circumstances.42  Passed in 1986, the SCA has not been amended to reflect 
society’s heavy use of new technologies and electronic services, such as 
social media, which have evolved since the SCA’s original enactment.43  
Consequently, courts will continue to play a critical role in defining how 
and whether the SCA applies to the varying features of different social 
media services by applying precedent from older technologies, such as 
text messaging pager services or electronic bulletin boards.44 
  
[13] The SCA provides that non-content records can be compelled 
through a warrant or court order. 45   With regard to the compelled 
disclosure of communication content, the SCA provides different levels of 
statutory privacy protection depending on how long the content has been 
in electronic storage.46  The government may obtain content that has been 
in electronic storage for 180 days or less “only pursuant to a warrant.”47  
                                                
42 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701-2711); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (applying the SCA to subpoenas issued to Facebook and MySpace while 
recognizing that no courts “have addressed whether social-networking sites fall within 
the ambit of the statute”). 
 
43 See Rudolph J. Burshnic, Note, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil 
Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1261-64 (2012). 
 
44 See, e.g., Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(holding that search warrant served by state authorities on MySpace to produce, among 
other things, the account IP address, the contents of the account user’s inbox, and sent 
email was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Stored Communications Act); 
Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (acknowledging the privacy settings of the user, the court 
quashed subpoenas seeking private messages on Facebook and MySpace as they were 
protected under the Stored Communications Act). 
 
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(a)-(b) (2006). 
 
46 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283. 
 
47 Id. 
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“The government has three options for obtaining communications . . . that 
have been in electronic storage with an electronic service provider for 
more than 180 days: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) use an administrative 
subpoena; or (3) obtain a court order under § 2703(d).”48 
 
[14] At least one Circuit Court of Appeals has called into question the 
constitutionality of the SCA.49  In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth 
Circuit held that “the government agents violated the Fourth Amendment 
when they obtained the contents of [defendant’s] e-mails” without a 
warrant and added that, “to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the 
government to obtain such e-mails warrantlessly, the SCA is 
unconstitutional.”50  The court reasoned that “[o]ver the last decade, e-
mail has become ‘so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be 
[an] essential means or necessary instrument[] for self-expression, even 
self-identification’” and that therefore, “e-mail requires strong protection 
under the Fourth Amendment.”51  Noting that e-mail was analogous to a 
phone call or letter and that the internet service provider was the 
intermediary who made e-mail communication possible, the functional 
equivalent of a post office or telephone company, the court concluded that 
given “the fundamental similarities between e-mail and traditional forms 
                                                
48 Id. (citation omitted).  Since Warshak, most major providers state that they require a 
search warrant to compel the stored contents of any account.  See, e.g., Information for 
Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (“A 
search warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or equivalent state warrant procedures upon a showing of probable cause is 
required to compel the disclosure of the stored contents of any account, which may 
include messages, photos, videos, wall posts, and location information.”). 
 
49 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.  
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. at 286 (citations omitted).  
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of communication, it would defy common sense to afford e-mails lesser 
Fourth Amendment protection.”52  However, Congress made clear that 
changing the law will require extended consideration when, on December 
24, 2012, the Senate removed from proposed legislation an amendment to 
the SCA that would have prevented authorities from viewing a person’s e-
mail messages without obtaining a warrant.53  In the meantime, courts will 
play a key role in clarifying how the SCA applies not only to e-mails, but 
also to the social media that has rapidly become as pervasive and 
important to people as e-mail. 
 
VI.  DEFINING A DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
REGARDING SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
 
[15] Courts have also started grappling with novel issues relating to the 
constitutionality of the government’s use of information obtained from 
social media companies in criminal proceedings.54  For example, a New 
York appellate court will soon issue an opinion regarding Twitter’s appeal 
of two court orders in the prosecution of an Occupy Wall Street protestor 
in People v. Harris.55  The trial court held that the defendant lacked 
standing to move to quash the government’s third-party subpoena to 
                                                
52 Id. at 285-86. 
 
53 See Noel Brinkerhoff, Congress, at Last Minute, Drops Requirement to Obtain 
Warrant to Monitor Email, ALLGOV (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.allgov.com/news/top-
stories/congress-at-last-minute-drops-requirement-to-obtain-warrant-to-monitor-email-
121225?news=846578. 
 
54 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that warrantless seizure of emails from ISP 
pursuant to SCA violated Fourth Amendment); see also Nathan Petrashek, Comment, 
The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1513-32 (2010) (arguing that individuals should have Fourth 
Amendments rights in their privately shared information on social networking platforms). 
 
55 As of the date of publication, the appeal had not been decided. 
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Twitter for his account records and that the Fourth Amendment did not 
protect his tweets.56  The trial court similarly denied Twitter’s motion to 
quash the government’s subpoenas for the defendant’s Twitter records for 
the same reasons.57  Although Twitter’s appeal is pending, Twitter turned 
over the data after the trial judge threatened the company with civil 
contempt and fines, which led to the defendant’s guilty plea in December 
2012.58 
 
[16] Notably, the defendant was only able to move to quash the 
subpoena because “Twitter’s policy is to notify users of requests for their 
information prior to disclosure,”59 a policy which is becoming more 
common among social media companies.60  Not only does Twitter notify 
its users that the company has received a government-issued information 
request for the user’s data, but it also protects its business by litigating 
                                                
56 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 
57 See People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 598 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (granting in part 
and denying in part the motion to quash).  The court found in favor of the government for 
all non-content information and content information from September 15, 2011, to 
December 30, 2011.  Content information less than 180 days old (tweeted on December 
31, 2011) could only be disclosed pursuant to a search warrant. 
 
58 See Russ Buettner, A Brooklyn Protester Pleads Guilty After His Twitter Posts Sink His 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A31, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/nyregion/malcolm-harris-pleads-guilty-over-2011-
march.html. 
 
59 Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/entries/41949-
guidelines-for-law-enforcement#section9 (last visited Jan, 15, 2013).  
 
60 See HOFMANN ET AL, supra note 15, at 8-9 (“Dropbox, LinkedIn, Sonic.net and 
SpiderOak have now joined Twitter in promising to notify their users when possible 
about government attempts to seek information about them.”). 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 3 
 
 
16 
 
against such third-party government subpoenas.61 
 
[17] On appeal, Twitter argued that the defendant has standing to quash 
the government’s subpoena because he has a proprietary interest in his 
tweets, pointing to the express language of Twitter’s Terms of Service.62  
Moreover, Twitter claimed that the Fourth Amendment protects the 
defendant’s tweets, primarily because the government concedes that the 
defendant did not make public the tweets that it sought.63  If a defendant 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in 
his or her non-public e-mails,64 refusing to afford that same protection to 
users’ non-public tweets would create “arbitrary line drawing.”65  Finally, 
even assuming that the tweets in question were public, Twitter argued that 
the government still requires a search warrant under the federal and New 
York constitutions.66  Notwithstanding Twitter’s pending appeal, Twitter 
complied with a court order requiring it to promptly submit the 
                                                
61 See Somini Sengupta, Twitter’s Free Speech Defender, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012, at 
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/technology/twitter-chief-lawyer-
alexander-macgillivray-defender-free-speech.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
62 Brief for Non-Party Movant-Appellant at *12-14, People v. Harris, No. 2011-080152, 
2012 WL 3867233 (N.Y. App. Div. Aug. 27, 2012) (noting Twitter’s Terms of Service 
state, “You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through 
the Services” (internal citation omitted)). 
 
63 See id. at *16, 19. 
 
64 See id. at *18-19 (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)).  
 
65 See id. at *20-21.  
 
66 See id. at *21-22 (citing People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-45 (2009); United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)). 
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defendant’s tweets under seal.67 
 
[18] The line-drawing concerns that Twitter expressed in its People v. 
Harris brief, that a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment in his or her social media records depends on the 
privacy settings for the particular account in question, were implicated in 
United States v. Meregildo, a case in which the court held that “[w]here 
Facebook privacy settings allow viewership of postings by ‘friends,’ the 
Government may access them through a cooperating witness who is a 
‘friend’ without violating the Fourth Amendment.”68 
 
[19] Some courts have concluded that individuals have “a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to [their] private Facebook information and 
messages.”69  Those courts, while recognizing the importance of properly 
understanding how Facebook works, distinguished between “private 
messaging” and posts to a user’s Facebook wall.70  Using privacy setting 
distinctions to determine social media users’ constitutional rights may 
result in arbitrary line drawing that might evaporate as social media 
                                                
67 Doug Austin, Twitter Turns Over Tweets in People v. Harris, EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG 
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.ediscoverydaily.com/2012/10/twitter-turns-over-tweets-in-
people-v-harris-ediscovery-case-law.html. 
 
68 United States v. Meregildo, No. 11 Cr. 576(WHP), 2012 WL 3264501, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2012). 
 
69 See, e.g., R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, Civ. No. 12-588 (MJD/LIB), 
2012 WL 3870868, at *12 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012) (finding that sixth grader had 
reasonable expectation of privacy in private messages exchanged via her password-
protected Facebook account); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 
2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that “webmail and private messaging [are] . . .  
inherently private”).  
 
70 Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 2012 WL 3870868, at *11; Crispin, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d at 991.  
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evolves.  Indeed, with Facebook’s customizable and post-specific privacy 
settings, a person who shares a message by posting it on another user’s 
wall can actually make it as private as information shared via a Facebook 
message.71 
 
[20] In addition, it remains uncertain whether, given the sheer breadth 
of information available in any particular social media account, one can 
successfully challenge search warrants for entire social media accounts for 
lacking sufficient limits or boundaries that would enable the government-
authorized reviewing agent to ascertain which information the agent is 
authorized to review.72  Ultimately, because an expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment is partly a function of whether “society [is] 
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable,” social media’s rapid 
proliferation through today’s society may influence the privacy protections 
afforded to social media evidence in the future.73 
 
VII.  DEFENDING A CRIMINAL CASE WITH SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
 
[21] Defendants face more significant obstacles than the government 
when seeking exculpatory evidence from social media companies.74  First, 
                                                
71 See Timeline Privacy, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/393920637330807/#!/help/393920637330807/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013).  
 
72 See In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Assoc. with Target Email Address, 
No. 2:12-mj-08119-JPO, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (holding that 
an individual has a Fourth Amendment right of privacy to emails and online faxes stored 
with, sent to, or received through third-party internet service providers). 
 
73 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284-85 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its 
guarantees will wither and perish.”). 
 
74 See Daniel K. Gelb, Defending a Criminal Case from the Ground to the Cloud, 27 
CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (2012). 
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defendants and their counsel do not share the government’s freedom to 
sleuth for publicly available social media evidence, although counsel 
should have free access to anything his or her client produced or can 
access. 75   Ethics opinions issued to lawyers in various states have 
established that a defendant’s lawyer may not “friend” or direct a third 
person to “friend” another party or witness in litigation in order to search 
for impeachment material or exculpatory evidence.76 
[22] Second, defendants face additional hurdles when seeking to issue a 
third party subpoena.77  Defendants may seek to subpoena social media 
companies for user information regarding the victim, the complaining 
witness, or another witness.78  In those instances, in federal criminal 
proceedings, defendants must pursue such non-party discovery pursuant to 
                                                
75 See Zach Winnick, Social Media an Ethical Minefield for Attorneys, LAW360 (Apr. 13, 
2012, 9:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/329795/social-media-an-ethical-
minefield-for-attorneys (noting ethical concerns regarding private counsel’s use of social 
networking sites in connection with litigation that are generally not shared by government 
authorities in investigations). 
 
76 See, e.g., PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROF’L GUIDANCE COMM., Op. 2009-02, at 1-3 (2009), 
available at 2009 WL 934623 (concluding that a social media friend request to a witness 
in the litigation by a third party for the purpose of gathering social media evidence is 
“deceptive” and in violation of ethical rules); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, COMM. ON PROF’L 
ETHICS, Op. 843, at 2 (2010), available at 2010 WL 3961381 (noting that accessing 
publicly available social media evidence is permissible but ‘friending” another party to 
do so is not); SAN DIEGO CNTY. BAR LEGAL ETHICS COMM., Op. 2011-02 (2011), 
available at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=LEC2011-2 (stating that ethics rules 
bar attorneys from making ex parte friend request of a represented party or ‘deceptive’ 
friend requests of unrepresented witnesses). 
 
77 In criminal litigation, the majority of evidence, electronic or otherwise, is collected by 
the government prior to trial, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 does not require 
the government to produce such evidence unless it is being used in the government’s 
case-in-chief.  See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 327 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16). 
 
78 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1). 
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 and seek a court order allowing 
such a subpoena.79  Among other hurdles in seeking such an order, the 
court may find that the evidence maintained by a social media website is 
“private,” in which case the SCA prohibits a non-governmental entity, 
such as Facebook and MySpace, from disclosing that information without 
the consent of the owner of the account or a government order.80  In one 
high profile example of a defendant clearing such hurdles, on October 19, 
2012, the court presiding over the Trayvon Martin murder trial granted the 
defendant’s motion seeking permission to subpoena Facebook and Twitter 
for the records of Trayvon Martin’s social media accounts in addition to 
Mr. Martin’s girlfriend’s Twitter account.81  Notwithstanding the order, 
Facebook and Twitter may challenge the subpoenas as Twitter so did in 
People v. Harris. 
 
[23] Despite these challenges, criminal defendants may attempt to use 
novel methods of obtaining exculpatory social media evidence.  For 
example, under Brady v. Maryland or Giglio v. United States, one may 
obtain a law enforcement officer’s social media account records. 82  
Moreover, courts may order jurors, witnesses, or third parties to produce 
or manipulate their social media information in unique and unprecedented 
                                                
79 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a), (c)(3).  
 
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (c) (2006).  
 
81 Erin Fuchs, A Jury Will Likely Scrutinize Trayvon Martin’s Deleted Facebook and 
Twitter Accounts, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct.19, 2012, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/zimmerman-can-subpoena-social-media-2012-10. 
 
82 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material”); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (“When 
the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ 
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule [under 
Brady].” (citation omitted)) . 
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ways.  For example, courts have: (1) ordered a juror to “execute a consent 
form sufficient to satisfy the exception” in the SCA to allow Facebook to 
produce the juror’s wall posts to defense counsel;83 (2) ordered a party to 
briefly change his Facebook profile to include a prior photograph so that 
his Facebook pages could be printed as they existed at a prior time;84 (3) 
recommended that an individual “friend” the judge on Facebook in order 
to facilitate an in camera review of Facebook photos and comments;85 and 
(4) ordered parties to exchange social media account user names and 
passwords.86  Such novel avenues of access to social media evidence may 
be considered when the defendant subpoenas a social media provider for 
certain records of a witness or victim and the social media company 
objects to the subpoena pursuant to the SCA or is unable to produce the 
evidence as it previously existed. 
 
VIII.  ADMISSIBILITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
 
[24] Social media is subject to the same rules of evidence as paper 
documents or other electronically stored information, but the unique 
nature of social media as well as the ease with which it can be manipulated 
or falsified creates hurdles to admissibility not faced with other 
                                                
83 Juror No. One v. Cal., No. CIV. 2:11397 WBS JFM, 2011 WL 567356, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2011). 
 
84 Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., Civil Action No. 10 3620 (GEB), 2011 WL 
3583408, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011).  
 
85 Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09cv00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1 (M.D. 
Tenn. June 3, 2010). 
  
86 See, e.g., Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) (ordering parties to exchange passwords to Facebook and a 
dating website); McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 
4403285 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (ordering plaintiff to produce Facebook and 
MySpace login credentials to opposing counsel for “read-only access”).  
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evidence.87  The challenges surrounding social media evidence demand 
that one consider admissibility when social media is preserved, collected, 
and produced.  It is important for counsel to memorialize each step of the 
collection and production process in addition to considering how counsel 
will authenticate a tweet, Facebook posting, or photograph.  Methods of 
authentication include presenting a witness with personal knowledge of 
the information (they wrote it, they received it, or they copied it), 
searching the computer itself to see if it was used to post or create the 
information, or attempting to obtain the information in question from the 
actual social media company that maintained the information the ordinary 
course of their business. 
 
[25] Notably, these same challenges face the government who must also 
consider the admissibility of social media when they conduct their 
investigation.  In United States v. Stirling, the government seized the 
defendant’s computer pursuant to a search warrant and provided the 
defendant with a forensic copy of the hard drive.88  The government also 
performed a forensic examination of the hard drive and extracted 214 
pages of Skype chats downloaded from the defendant’s computer, which 
were not “readily available by opening the folders appearing on the hard 
drive,” but did not provide this information to the defense until the 
morning of its expert’s testimony near the end of trial.89  The logs “had a 
                                                
87 See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011) (recognizing “[t]he potential 
for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site by someone other than its 
purported creator”). 
 
88 United States v. Stirling, No. 1:11-cr-20792-CMA, at 2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012), 
available at http://www.fuerstlaw.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/altonaga-order-
granting-new-trial1.pdf; see U.S. District Court in Miami Orders New Trial Based on 
Discovery Violation for Electronically Stored Information, FUERST ITTLEMAN DAVID & 
JOSEPH PL (June 25, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.fuerstlaw.com/wp/index.php/25/u-s-
district-court-in-miami-orders-new-trial-based-on-discovery-violation-for-electronically-
stored-information/. 
 
89 Id. at 2.  
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devastating impact” on the defendant because they contradicted many of 
his statements made during his testimony and he was convicted.90  In a 
short but stinging opinion ordering a new trial, the court found: 
 
[If a defendant] needs to hire a computer forensics expert 
and obtain a program to retrieve information not apparent 
by reading what appears in a disk or hard drive, then such a 
defendant should so be informed by the Government, 
which knows of the existence of the non-apparent 
information.  In such instance, and without the information 
or advice to search metadata or apply additional programs 
to the disk or hard drive, production has not been made in a 
reasonably usable form.  Rather, it has been made in a 
manner that disguises what is available, and what the 
Government knows it has in its arsenal of evidence that it 
intends to use at trial.91 
 
[26] While both government and defense attorneys continue to grapple 
with addressing and authenticating social media sources of evidence, 
courts largely seem to be erring on the side of admissibility and leaving 
any concerns about the evidence itself, such as who authored the evidence 
or whether the evidence is legitimate, to jurors to decide what weight to 
give that evidence.  For example, courts have ruled social media evidence 
as admissible where the content of the evidence contains sufficient indicia 
that it is the authentic creation of the purported user.92  In Tienda v. State, 
                                                
90 Id. 
 
91 Id. at 4-5.  
 
92 See, e.g., People v. Lesser, No. H034189, 2011 WL 193460, at *4, *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 21, 2011) (finding officer’s testimony that he cut and pasted portions of Internet chat 
transcript was sufficient for admissibility); People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 632-
33, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding conviction where the court correctly admitted a 
trial exhibit consisting of printouts of defendant’s MySpace page, which the prosecution's 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 3 
 
 
24 
 
the appellant was convicted of murder based in part on evidence that the 
prosecutors obtained after subpoenaing MySpace. 93  Specifically, “the 
State was permitted to admit into evidence the names and account 
information associated with [the defendant’s MySpace.com profiles], 
photos posted on the profiles, comments and instant messages linked to 
the accounts, and two music links posted to the profile pages.”94  The 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision and 
concluded that the MySpace profile exhibits used at trial were admissible 
because they were a sufficient “indicia of authenticity” that “the exhibits 
were what they purported to be—MySpace pages for which the appellant 
was responsible for” the content.95 
 
[27] In another recent case, a defendant was convicted of aggravated 
assault following a domestic dispute with his girlfriend.96  At trial, the 
prosecution introduced Facebook messages sent from the defendant’s 
account in which he indicated that he regretted striking his girlfriend and 
asked for her forgiveness.97  The defendant denied sending the Facebook 
messages and argued that both he and his girlfriend had access to each 
                                                                                                                     
gang expert relied on in forming his opinion that defendant was an active gang member); 
People v. Fielding, No. C06022, 2010 WL 2473344, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 
2010) (finding incriminating MySpace messages sent by defendant authenticated by 
victim who testified he believed defendant had sent them; inconsistencies and conflicting 
inferences regarding authenticity goes to weight of evidence, not its authenticity).  
 
93 Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 634-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).  
 
94 Id. at 635. 
 
95 Id. at 647. 
 
96 Campbell v. Texas, 382 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Tex. App. 2012). 
 
97 Id. at 551.  
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other’s Facebook accounts.98  On appeal, the court, acknowledging that 
“electronic communications are susceptible to fabrication and 
manipulation,” affirmed the trial court’s ruling that allowed the state to 
authenticate the messages through circumstantial evidence, most notably 
that they were sent from the defendant’s account and that the girlfriend 
testified that she did not send the messages.99  In another instance, a 
federal court found that photographs of a defendant from his MySpace 
page, which depicted him holding cash, were relevant in his criminal trial 
for possession of firearms and drugs, but it withheld ruling on the 
admissibility of the photos and whether they presented a risk of unfair 
prejudice.100 
 
[28] Given the proliferation of social media, the increasing 
sophistication of technology, and the potential challenges relating to the 
reliability or authentication of social media, the authentication and 
admissibility of such evidence will likely continue to be the subject of 
vigorous disputes between parties that may mean the difference between 
ultimate guilt and innocence.  
 
IX.  JURIES AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
[29] Admissibility is just one challenge that the Internet and social 
media pose at trial.  Another difficult issue relates to what information 
may be gathered about prospective jurors.  At least one bar association has 
determined that attorneys may use social media websites to conduct juror 
                                                
98 Id.  
 
99 Id. at 549-50, 552.  
 
100 United States v. Drummond, No. 1:09-cr-00159, 2010 WL 1329059, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 29, 2010).  The defendant ultimately entered a guilty plea, and the court did not 
make a final ruling on the admissibility of the photographs.  Plea Agreement, Drummond, 
No. 1:09-cr-00159, 2010 WL7367722 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2010).  
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research as long as no communication occurs between the lawyer and the 
juror as a result of the research.101  However, attorneys may not research 
jurors if that research results in the juror receiving a communication.102  
Third parties working for the benefit of or on behalf of an attorney must 
comport with the same restrictions as that attorney and, similarly to other 
ethical restrictions on defense counsel’s ability to use social media as an 
investigative tool discussed supra, an attorney cannot use deception to 
gain access to a juror’s website or to obtain information.103 
 
[30] One of the most recent and challenging social media trends relates 
to jurors using wireless communication devices to look up a defendant’s 
criminal record, conduct their own investigation into a case, post their 
opinions about the case on social media websites, or attempt to “friend” 
parties, lawyers, witnesses, or judges.  In some instances, this conduct has 
resulted in mistrials and overturned convictions.104  In other instances, 
                                                
101 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, Formal Op. 2012-2, at 5 
(2012) available at 2012 WL 2304271; see also N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N COMM. ON 
PROF’L ETHICS, Formal Op. 743 (2011), available at 
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1450_0.pdf (advising that it is 
ethical for lawyers to vet potential jurors by monitoring social network activity provided 
there is no contact or communication with the prospective jurors, and the lawyer does not 
seek to friend jurors, subscribe to Twitter accounts, send jurors tweets, or act in any way 
that alerts the jurors to the monitoring); Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 227-
28 (Ky. 2012) (adopting the model established by the New York County Lawyers 
Association). 
 
102 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 
101, at 5 (noting that even if an attorney unknowingly or inadvertently causes a 
communication with a juror, such conduct may run afoul of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct).  
 
103 Id. at 6-7. 
 
104 See Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 246, 247, 249 (Ark. 2011) (reversing 
appellant’s murder conviction and calling for a new trial when a juror tweeted several 
times during court proceedings, writing in one tweet, “Choices to be made. Hearts to be 
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such conduct has caused courts to conduct lengthy hearings to determine 
the impact of the juror’s actions.  For example, in Sluss v. Commonwealth, 
a defendant appealed his murder, assault, and evidence tampering 
convictions on the grounds that two members of the jury, including one 
who served as the jury foreperson, failed to indicate during voir dire that 
they had each “friended” the victim’s mother through Facebook.105  The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky, noting that being a “friend” on Facebook was 
not enough by itself to prove bias for disqualification as those 
“friendships” may be superficial, reversed and remanded the case with 
instructions to hold a hearing on whether the jurors should have been 
struck from the jury panel on the basis of their alleged social networking 
activity.106  Finally, the inappropriate use of social media has led to stiff 
penalties for both jurors and attorneys.107 
                                                                                                                     
broken. We each define the great line,” and later tweeting “Its [sic] over” before the jury 
announced its verdict).  
 
105 Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 220-22. 
 
106 Id. at 223, 228-29; see also U.S. v. Ganias, Crim No. 3:08CR224(EBB), 2011 WL 
4738684, (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 2011).  In Ganias, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
on the eve of sentencing based on alleged juror improprieties.  Id.  at *1.  The juror 
posted a variety of comments on the Facebook page, ranging from “Jury duty 2morrow. I 
may get to hang someone ... can't wait ...” before the presentation of the evidence, to 
“Guinness for lunch break.  Jury duty ok today” during the three-week trial.  Id. at *2.  
On the day of the verdict he posted “Guilty :),” and he also added a fellow juror as one of 
his Facebook friends.  Id.  Taken together, the defendant argued that the comments 
showed his Sixth Amendment rights were offended due to a biased juror.  Id. at *1.  
When questioned, the juror assured the judge that he was merely “joking,” and that he 
“absolutely was an impartial and fair juror.”  U.S. v. Ganias, Crim No. 3:08-CR-00224-
EBB, 2011 WL 4738684, *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 2011).  The court found those statements 
presumptively honest, and denied the defendant’s motion.  See id. at *4. 
 
107 See John Barry, Hillsborough Judge Vows to Send Prospective Juror to Jail, TAMPA 
BAY TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/hillsborough-judge-vows-to-send-
prospective-juror-to-jail/1255802 (noting that prospective juror faces jail time for 
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[31] Both legislatures and courts have attempted to respond to these 
trends.  For example, California adopted a new statute clarifying that 
jurors may not use social media and the Internet, such as texting, Twitter, 
Facebook, and Internet searches, to research or disseminate information 
about cases, and they can be held in criminal or civil contempt for 
violating these restrictions.108  On August 21, 2012, a Judicial Conference 
Committee announced that it had created an updated model set of jury 
instructions to help judges discourage jurors from conducting research or 
communicating about their cases through social media.109  The model 
instructions state: 
 
I know that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the 
Internet and other tools of technology. . . . You may not 
communicate with anyone about the case on your cell 
phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, 
                                                                                                                     
researching case and discussing it with the other jurors even after Tampa Bay court 
provided each member of the jury pool with a written order not to research or discuss the 
case and admonished and warned the jurors about the order at each break); Robert 
Eckhart, Juror Jailed Over Facebook Friend Request, HERALD-TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 2012, 
available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20120216/ARTICLE/120219626 
(reporting that a court sentenced a juror to three days in jail for sending a Facebook 
message to the defendant and then posting “Score…I got dismissed!!  apparently they 
frown upon sending a friend request to the defendant…haha,” on Facebook after his 
dismissal from the jury); David Ovalle, Lawyer’s Facebook Photo Causes Mistrial in 
Miami-Dade Murder Case, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/12/2999630/lawyers-facebook-photo-causes.html 
(reporting that a Miami judge declared a mistrial in a murder case after the public 
defender posted a photo of her client’s leopard-print underwear on Facebook, which also 
led to the attorney’s firing). 
 
108 See 2011 Cal. Stat. 181.   
 
109 See Revised Jury Instructions Hope to Deter Juror Use of Social Media During Trial, 
UNITED STATES COURTS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://news.uscourts.gov/revised-jury-
instructions-hope-deter-juror-use-social-media-during-trial.   
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or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including 
Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or YouTube.  
You may not use any similar technology of social media, 
even if I have not specifically mentioned it here.110 
 
[32] The chair of the Conference Committee who provided the updated 
rules stressed that:  
 
The judges recommended that jurors frequently be 
reminded about the prohibition on social media before the 
trial, at the close of a case, at the end of each day before 
jurors return home, and other times, as appropriate.  Jurors 
should be told why refraining from use of social media 
promotes a fair trial.  Finally, jurors should know the 
consequences of violations during trial, such as mistrial and 
wasted time.  Those recommendations are now part of the 
guidelines.111 
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
 
[33] Social media evidence is undeniably a critical new frontier of 
government investigations and criminal proceedings.  Social media has 
rapidly become so pervasive that while users are creating warehouses of 
data every day and social media companies roll out new communication 
features, courts, government agencies, practitioners, and the social media 
companies themselves are struggling to understand how this information 
fits into existing legal paradigms of constitutional protections, the SCA, 
                                                
110 JUDICIAL CONF. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., PROPOSED MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS:  THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR 
COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf. 
 
111 UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 109.  
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and rules of evidence.  Despite this uncertainty, one thing is clear.  The 
government has a deep and largely one-sided set of tools for seeking out 
and obtaining social media evidence that plays an ever-increasing critical 
role in their investigations and litigation. 
